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AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN SECURITY AGENDA IN TIME OF BARACK OBAMA'S PRESIDENCY IN VIEW OF A "DOCTRINE"^{1*}

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Abstract: The study focuses on the international security agenda found within the Euro-Atlantic arena of political and military activities, and on different institutional and organizational levels of various security interests, visible through official transcripts, discussions, and activities of Euro-Atlantic organizations, including the European Union, United States, Poland, and other States of Europe, in view of President Barack Obama's policies. Authors' approach towards the subject is analytical, whereas the particular elements, especially the chosen security outlooks examined, are presented in order to present a synthetic view of the elements and generalized evaluation evolving. The spatiotemporal extent of analysis is positioned within the frames of Barack Obama's presidency. Authors argue that, since the main security agenda and the Euro-Atlantic relations, with its emanation on other regions of the world, centers on the American military leadership, run by the policy and leadership of the United States, the changes of the White House cabinet is determinative for other areas. Yet, the growth of the European Union into the big European entity would also become an important determinant within this time-based outlook and a major factor in the following relations. The appropriate discussion with fact analysis follows. Place of Poland in such a scenario became difficult in a way, that given the political party government of Poland, it would have to take sides, or level the international differences between the USA and the EU, even in a limited capacity of influencing the outcome.

Keywords: international relations, politics, military policies, security agenda, Poland, European Union, United States, Poland.

Introduction

The changes within any political outlook of one, or the other centers in executive levels of governance, will obviously change the vision contained in transparent

¹ This is the first part of an article on President Barack Obama's "doctrinal" views, the next part titled *Barack Obama's Presidency In View Of Foreign Policy Arrangements Affecting Regional And International Security*, will be published in *National Security Studies* no. 11/2017.

knowledge arrangements, and stemming out rational activities in planning and executive order performance. This determinant will also hold to be true, when an academic scholar simplifies conglomerate of sequential and perceptible events or phenomenon, as is the partial focus of this article, dealing with political, international politics, and security field agendas. It is both true when dealing with particular phenomenon and phenomenon sets. In the case of foreign policy executive outlook and directives there is a multiple elements of both tangible and intangible forms, of the main actors and their propagators or intellectual antagonists.

Our methodological approach is typical of a research analysis based on factual description, and generalization alike, since political activities are either accidental and individual, or purposeful and collective. For all the practical purposes, it can be stated that the analysis performed in view of the rational process that is envisioned with determinants created or adjusted by a leader or group of leaders, have its final outcome in other, this time empirically observable behaviors and conjoined activities as the effect of temporal values. In such a case, question what is the sequence from the beginning to the end, is the most important one. Spatio-temporal spectrum of observation in such a case is easy to ascertain or inferred, because of the easily distinguished *a priori* or *a posteriori* categories, used as the set tools of academic description. This, simplistically put allows the individual analysis, in reference to the main ideas classified within the subject or field of study, enabling to rationalize the evolvement of a new phenomenon or sets of events, within the boundaries of the known, thus showing its potentiality or verifying its outcome. In our case it allows to determine the evolvement of a “doctrine” and ranges of political understanding descriptive also to various additional fields, including implication of one field of study on the other ones, as for example implication of politics and international relations on the field of security.

The authors therefore, are trying to describe the inference of executive policies and its impact on international security agenda, and the rationalization behind the usage of the so-called “Obama doctrine”, when applied to international policies, in view of current security status of global relations. We particularly are interested in its envisioned spectrum, as described in *The Atlantic* – the issue of April 2016, by Jeffrey Goldberg when used as the title of his article: “The Obama Doctrine. The US President talks through his hardest decisions about America’s role in the world”². This article and the other articles corresponding, of the same author and other authors, sparked the debate on the president’s Obama world political outline, strangely enough done at the last end of his second term in office, and not at the beginning thereof. Prior to *The Atlantic*’s questionable call for “Obama’s doctrine”, we could read in *Foreign Policy* (January 12, 2016) a different presentation. In an argumentative article by Nick

² Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine. The US President talks through his hardest decisions about America’s role in the world”, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/>.

Danforth, titled "Thank Goodness There's No Obama Doctrine", we find an opinion that most of the American presidential doctrines are failures. Danforth praises, of course (sic!) that pres. Obama did not have one: Obama's goal of avoiding "stupid stuff" might not amount to a doctrine, but it's still better than the alternative"³; in such a case, what is the issue with those, rather ideological stands? Hence, our discussion below in view that "stupid stuff" is not always stupid, and "good intentions" are not always "good". Nonetheless, the question stands, does final description of executive policies, as described by the interested party and loyal journalist, amount to "real" doctrine? And upon their evaluation are those policies anything close to the "American realism" that we were used to in the past, prior to pres. Obamas taking the office, especially when we take into account the long 8 years activity in the field of international relations impacting global security of many nations alike.

Broad question asked in this case, is whether the presidency itself and its policies, activities and outcomes, present any new values, in practical sense, for the state of global security. Regardless of Obama's protagonists and antagonist assessments, the authors' opinion is, obviously, yes. Question remains, is it for good or for worse? This can be verified when we compare the president's Obama value stated and its validation, as matched by its practical outcome and its justification, in comparison to the previous examples of American presidencies. Even if the answers seem to be obvious through empirical factors, its pragmatics is not clearly visible or understandable, neither for some political leaders of the world, especially the regional superpowers (what will be examined), nor for all political scientist working within the field of international relations or security studies. We do however come across the various opinions, that state: yes – there is the Obama doctrine, and that, no – there is not – it is just a journalist pundit's opinion⁴. Hence, this is a short analysis allowing the follow-ups and the extended studies in comprehension of the security policies evolvment. In this particular case however, (of our first part of discussion, that will be followed by the next article), we rather concentrate on general factors, including already described or analyzed. There will be particular add-ons, and inferential processes specified, for example by Ch. S. Pierce and his pragmatic approach to reality and possibility of knowledge, of such⁵. Pragmatism is part of the both, in general, the philosophical and intellectual American outlook, present since XIX century, and in its variations of the specifically international politics under the

³ N. Danforth, "Thank Goodness There's No Obama Doctrine", <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/12/thank-goodness-theres-no-obama-doctrine/>

⁴ Cf. C. Dueck, *The Obama Doctrine: American Grand Strategy Today*, Oxford University Press (2015), and its review by Leon Hadar, "Why There Is No Obama Doctrine", <https://www.questia.com/magazine/1P3-3867012781/why-there-is-no-obama-doctrine>

⁵ Vide, *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, <https://colorsemiotica.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/peirce-collectedpapers.pdf>

“guidance” of the XX century realism, so obvious in international relations theory, that impacted on world security;

This theoretical knowledge factor, within the social studies and other fields akin, refers usually to some previous political and doctrinal involvement. Yes, it can be perhaps, of an ideological persuasion, or other intangibles that become known only *post factum*. In a sense of the authors understanding of fundamentals of security studies, the different boundaries and multidisciplinary dimensions, the interchangeability within the field of interests in researches itself determine, of course, the process and rationale of this short study focus, among the others. Any evaluative manner, not just when discussing the pres. Barack Obama’s security policies but generally, when discussing the issues of international relations and security studies, presents a generous number of opinions and concepts, we can agree to that, problem being as always is the subjectivity and the objectivity of an attitude. The best approach perhaps, at least in this case, is to stand in the middle ground, but hypothetically speaking, pres. Obama, cannot be seen as the “middle way man” since his policies rather clash with the previous realist approach towards the international politics. His policies seem rather the policies of the appeasement, in the American progressive way, or social-democratic European way.

However, this is not demonstratively an accurate description of a problem in issue, since the normative values are never independent of philosophical precepts, and while evolving as a tangible and a posteriori reference to presidential activities, as observed in other presidencies, in times of Barack Obama its process became blurred with many overstatements, or idealized notion of reality. What it does at the end, it clashes with it, and the good intentions are not, nor ever have been, enough. What may turn out to be the case example of not pragmatic, but rather a problematic the 44th American presidency, overburdened with the ideological statements that are never fully transmuted into any new substantial factors for governmental activities, that could be taken as an example of own deeds in making. Its nature is such, that they can only be responded to, but not co-joined on the international security arena. This leaves the USA alienated of the practical values for the ideas presented, in fact, making the presidency more ideological, than the previous ones, but surely not pragmatic, what should be expected of the American policies. This is of course the case, if pragmatism still means anything for the American foreign policy.

Therefore, the authors off hand can present a hypothesis, stating that during the 8-year term of the last president in office, the security activities and others within the international field of interests were created *ad hoc*. We can at the beginning just speculate as to the impact that the ideological persuasion run and hindered the particular events evolving. And nowhere in pres. Obamas presidency can we observe that a given presidential approach is a doctrine growing in unison with the president’s and his cabinet plans or tangible activities within domestic and foreign

fields of involvement. We can observe, however, the rather ambiguous ideological imposition of naïve academic worldview, typical of the journalist from the both, the leftist liberal or rightist conservative sides, that brings more misunderstanding than clarification. The authors – political scientists and adepts of security studies dealing constantly with security issues, recognize that the world leader of any ideological persuasion is rather not persuasive when dealing with the very complex problems of international politics, with direct implication for security. Subsequently in reality, not ideology or doctrine matters in evaluation of executive policies, but simply the outcome of activities or non-activity, as it might be the case. In this case, we can look at some of the accomplishments – or lack thereof – in US foreign policy while discussing the journalist's "wishful thinking doctrine".

Barack Obama's good intentions and good record prior to his presidency

How do we define the "good intentions" as in referring to foreign policy, and specifically to Barack Obama's foreign policies? The ambiguous ideological imposition known as "good intention" is a verbalization in abstract theoretical terms, which in practice may turn only half-rights, since "intention" is only the beginning, never the end. Intention as a whole is an idea – in platonic terms. In theoretical and academic terms, it is a value in itself, a priori proof of a dogma, whatever the dogma might be. Since in politics, the values are more harmful than in books, political speeches or intellectual discussions, for which the public, especially the "leftist liberals" of both – American and European – sides of the Atlantic Ocean, loved pres. Obama so much, it is also important to ask what is the fundament of the pres. Obama' intellectual outlook. This can be easily done checking for those of the re-written phrases of the classical political philosophers or charismatic leaders, which we can find in his statement. (We will leave this problem in parenthesis, for now, since this is not true only of Barack Obama, but of any charismatic political leaders on different sides of the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans.) It is therefore understood that, what works for the democratic elections may have a different face value at the end. Simply put, good intentions may turn bad in a complex, pluralistic, and sometimes even chaotic international environment. Any retrospective can verify the good intention policy based on the executive accomplishment, nonetheless.

Perhaps it is usually better not to reveal our intentions at all, especially if its premises are too philosophical for the others to understand, or when those intentions clash with the reality. When we direct the foreign policy's philosophically true agenda, we always have to remember that the abstract or too abstract discussion may lead to misunderstanding in culturally diverse world, and create a more chaotic environment. Simply put, because of the "misunderstandings" the other political entities start to

behave irrationally from our vantage point, and rationally from their vantage point. Perhaps the rationale behind the “good intention” verbal policy is to appease, more than give an example. If we are dealing with “political angels” it is ok, but what if the others are not “angels” at all, and will use such policy to their own advantage? Well, let us remember, world political environment is not a secure environment. It is a nature’s environment, and nature is all about energy, as the physicists tell us. This is perhaps the reason, for which, at the end the world becomes even more dangerous place to live, if there is no way of directing this energy. This is where clear political doctrine is so important for the international and security relations. It can never be *ad hoc* or reactive policy, actions present only a superficial view of what is in the making. This surely promotes the irrational behavior of other political actors, who unable to adhere or react in view of proper normative and corresponding practical values, will act on their own needs or despairs.

Of course, we can observe and react to the outcome of any relation, but seeing the process, that is in this case more important. This is important, for if, within the international settings, we only react to the outcome, we are always one-step behind, and no number of good “philosophical”, “liberal” intentions will prepare us for the end. Well then, how in practical turns can we describe processes, this will determine the socio-political evolution or devolution within the international relations that can be described not only by what is known, but also by what should be known, and acted upon. Based on the process we most likely can observe the influence of the ideological inferences, the deductive, inductive, and abductive reasoning describing the international actors, and their vision contained within the interpretation of security. When this occurs in a broad spectrum of interests, where vantage points include security policies at the highest levels of orders, various ideological spectrums, and pragmatics, on the individual level, behavior of the states will become apparent. The fundamental facts of expressions will become particular, presenting danger of internal clash in political programs influencing the security agendas.

Usually, the phenomenon of interrelation between who proposes and determines the agenda, who executes its premises, and who was left out in this process, will later also determine the political outlook in general. Conversely, if this is presented in semi-democratic⁶ settings of United States and European Union, in reference to

⁶ If we are to agree, that US is leaning closer to oligarchy and moving away from democracy, based on the congressional law outcome, where the system of checks and balances in reference to state power distributions is intact, but the outcome of legislative votes does not provide enough support for the constituencies. Vide, Martin Gilens and Benjamin I. Page, *Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens*, https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/mgilens/files/gilens_and_page_2014_-testing_theories_of_american_politics.doc.pdf

domestic areas or if it will be based on some domestic issue generalized⁷, will later also determine the political outlook in foreign relations and its original factors are left out when ontologically speaking we can refer to the final construct. Before that however, let's quickly look at the agenda where he surely achieved rather a positive outcome, in progressive agenda on racial inequality. Other issues when it comes to problems of the middle class, are open for discussion, we just briefly summarize the ideological stand, or leftist liberal persuasion of his own perception, as follows.

When it comes to this domestic agenda, we cannot talk of "good intentions", we can just talk of the "good outcome". Barack Obama is a proof himself that the American progressive agenda works. Maybe not as fast as some would want it, but that's a different issue. As the first Afro-American president, he is part of the progressive change in America. We cannot argue about that. We can perhaps argue not how much he is a part of the progressive solution, that is, in what respect he is the creator of the solutions, and how much he has achieved on that matter himself, during the two terms of his presidency. We do not think however, that he is himself boasting on such issues, he is seeing it rather as an example of his ideological outlook. This clearly shows through his speech, and is still a sense of his desire, to eradicate racial economic and other inequalities. What is his vision on this?

We believe that his Howard University (one of the most important American universities, and surely great Afro-American university with many prodigious scholars of the past and present), commencement ceremony speech of May 7, 2016, presented what we considered a summary of current racial status in the United States, and the predicaments, that surely run through his life. His vision is "...a vision of uplift; a vision for an America where our fates would be determined not by our race, gender, religion, or creed, but where we would be free -- in every sense -- to pursue our individual and collective dreams". And he continues, "...I remarked that just 60 years earlier, my father might not have been served in a D.C. restaurant -- at least not certain of them. There were no black CEOs of Fortune 500 companies. Very few black judges. Shoot, as Larry Wilmore pointed out last week, a lot of folks didn't even think blacks had the tools to be a quarterback. Today, former Bull Michael Jordan isn't just the greatest basketball player of all time -- he owns the team. (Laughter.) When I was graduating, the main black hero on TV was Mr. T. Rap and hip hop were counterculture, underground. Now, Shonda Rhimes owns Thursday night, and Beyoncé runs the world. We're no longer only entertainers, we're producers, studio

⁷ We can observe this generalization in reference to ethnicity and racial historical problems that the United States and the countries of the Western Europe are going through at the moment, through their appeasement policies, surely based on the evils done to their racial minorities or in countries occupied -- colonized throughout the world. However, this impact of historical importance is very dangerous for the national security of different States, and the global security in general because of the nature of resentment, negatively affecting the politics both domestically and abroad.

executives. No longer small business owners – we’re CEOs, we’re mayors, representatives, Presidents of the United States”⁸

Probably much more problematic would be his statements about the middle class and the outcome of those policies. There are many of his assertions referring to this issue, and corresponding many critics of his domestic policies, we do not however wish to participate in this rather problematic issue, since it should be analyzed with more scrutiny, than in a space of one article focusing on different concerns. Nonetheless, we are presenting, as an example, his “wishful thinking” domestic approach, as visible through his speech of January 26, 2013: “...As President, my top priority is simple: to do everything in my power to fight for middle-class families and give every American the tools they need to reach the middle class”⁹

Prior to any outcome of intentions, president’s Obama political views were known as that of the State of Illinois Senator (1997 – 2004), and the Senator of the US Senate (2005 – 2008). As the State Senator, he helped to re-structure the Illinois welfare program, to establish tax credit for the working families, to increase childcare subsidies, to improve health care for citizens with lower income, to help blue-collar and other workers, and crime victims. He was also responsible for creating a bill requiring the police to tape their interrogations, and among other positive accomplishments responsible for major ethics reform. He was considered a pragmatic, able to work with different sides for betterment of the people. In the US Senate, he was active in passing immigration reform; involved in arms reduction, relief aid, federal transparency, election reform, climate control, troop reduction and other military issues, Iran divestment and nuclear terrorism reduction¹⁰. Let us live the domestic intentions and outcomes, and his Senate work (where he was considered a loyal democrat), aside of our discussion on “The Atlantic’s Obama Doctrine”.

The “wishful thinking doctrine” and the international relations outcome

The “wishful thinking doctrine” is really a preaching, or a body of general ideas acceptable on the intellectual level as a humane policy for the global village. Its pleasing character has one common danger; it is an *a priori* ideological statement, “platonic” in character and conceptual in outcome. It materializes as the unforeseen

⁸ B. Obama, “Remarks by the President at Howard University Commencement Ceremony” <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/05/07/remarks-president-howard-university-commencement-ceremony>.

⁹ B. Obama, “Weekly Address: Two Nominees Who Will Fight for the American People”, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/26/weekly-address-two-nominees-who-will-fight-american-people>

¹⁰ “President Barack Obama”, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/president-obama>.

defect of the ideal. It is dangerous at the outset, since may be considered as an ethical screen for practical purposes, or inability to change the values into the norms of concurrence, what is important for democracy and international stability. And since the international actors vary, its reception by others may be unforeseen. This is what makes it dangerous when used in international settings, its unpredictability and potential for power voids, what usually brings up aggressive behavior. Yet, it correlates with the “good intentions” that we mentioned above, as we can explain.

Whatever the critics of Barack Obama would like to criticize, when we observe his activities and read his different statements, upon evaluation we can surely decide that the normative values, are by virtue of the natural law and intellectual understanding, honest and desirable. Some even come close to those of the European liberal and social-democratic values¹¹ that along the US president, the EU leaders also talk so freely about. When it is a question of ideological similarities, its origin is obvious, the first generation of natural law premises (XVII c.) and the second generation of natural law premises (XVIII c.) – At least in a sense of correspondence. Those similarities are true and especially visible when we bear in mind that the leftist liberalism and the social-democratic ideology are very strong in the European Union. This is not only considering that some important EU leaders (and the country leaders at the same time) like Francois Hollande, with his French Socialist Party background, are part of such ideological scheme. This is also the case, to some extent, with Angela Merkel, who started her career in the communist youth organization of the German Democratic Republic, later joining Helmut Kohl's CDU. Looking at CDU from the US perspective, we can notice that it is not very far away ideologically from the typical “leftist” pro-social thinking. It is so, because of its strong socio-liberal economic program and mixed group of followers – Christian socialists and German nationals, adherent to traditional national values, some nationalistically inclined; Of course, when it comes to the implementation of Euro-Atlantic values, and especially considering its impact on Euro-Atlantic practices, the extended analysis is necessary. In this instance, we are presenting only the similarity points, since the practice of those values, from both the US and European perspective, including Polish perspective, is more complicated, but a review will follow later.

Barack Obama's stand on values can be generalized as that of the compassionate and humanitarian thinker, where his statements, in reference to international relations and inequalities in post-colonial world, reflect the idea of equality and egalitarianism (in national politics). This is not a surprise since his African father was born in Kenya, where part of President's Obama family still lives. In a sense of being the first Afro-American president of the global power, he is not only an example to

¹¹ Vide, B. Obama, “Remarks by President Obama in Address to the People of Europe”, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/25/remarks-president-obama-address-people-europe>

the America's Afro-American communities, but also he is an example for those, who in the past were subjugated by the Western European powers, through at least four centuries. Let us also keep in mind that, historically the Western European powers worked economically for the enslavement of Africa with their Muslim counterparts – what was the European-Muslim “common venture”. (It seems also true, needless to say, that some African-Americans, some Europeans, and some Muslims, seldom mention this fact). It does have its impact however, on global security agenda of to-day in a way of American concession policy. It is visible in Obama's retreat from major international areas of interests, leaving dangerous voids. Dangerous since not distributing power among the equal international partners but seceding it to regional major players, leaves the weaker States and weaker allies under a different dominion, what may affect the strategy of security overall.

Keeping in mind the above we can also adhere to generalizations that may hypothetically describe the world of political insecurity we live in currently, or security as the others would want to believe. This came with a strategy change that may be described as a switch from the realist outlook, to the...? Well, some could say liberal, some-leftist liberal, perhaps social-democratic outlook. Whether it is liberal, conservative, oligarchic, or other type typical political viewpoint, when it comes to a high-level politics, pragmatically speaking it is always mixed. Everything depends on the direction the politicians are aiming at their message. Sometimes they even don't have to verbalize it strongly, it is still visible as an determinant of change in view of practical solutions previously accepted. This for example was the case with bilateral agreement between Poland and USA on the European Interceptor Site in Poland. There was signed on August 20th. 2008, the “Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Poland Concerning the Deployment of Ground-Based Ballistic Missile Defense Interceptors in the Territory of the Republic of Poland”. It was officially signed in Warsaw, where US was represented by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and Poland by Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski. However, soon after Barack Obama was sworn in as the President, there was a “new architecture” of the missile defense system what in fact meant “de facto renunciation of the deployment on Polish territory of GBI interceptors (Ground Based Interceptor) referred to in the Agreement¹²”. Poland accepted without a choice this “new architecture”, but it was clearly understood as American President's conciliation to Russia's objections.

This may be one of the first marking moments for the evaluation, in respect to the “new outlook” of Pres. Obama's on executive powers and its perspective. This was also a step back policy that began influencing the international power arrangements.

¹² http://www.mfa.gov.pl/en/foreign_policy/security_policy/missile_defence/md_negotiations/

This implied the changing in focus of interests, or weight in international politics. The focus was really a sudden switch, from the European theater of operations as of the primary importance, to the Asian politics – the Pacific and Far East. This, in the authors' opinion, left out the entire Euro-Atlantic theater operations unattended by the United States. At the same time, the Middle Eastern theater of operations was managed rather poorly, what created more troubles with the "Arabian spring revolutions", instead of expected peace profits.

Looking from particularly centered perspective of Poland's sovereign inclinations, this created a number of vacuums and promoted uncontrolled growth of countries that are considered the regional power States, within the big European Union's organization controlling it for rather particular political gains of their own national perspectives. Pres. Obama's turning American back at Europe allowed the growth of German-French domination in the European Union politics, shifted the military weight and security concerns to liberal and social-democratic propositions within the European Union. Since the ideology can be considered, in this case, a unifier of two different perspectives on international relations, and where another one had to be abandoned. What seemed like an abandonment of the international relations' practices of many decades past? It seems that the abandonment was done for the sake of ideology itself, since not many practical gains, if any, came out of it. Surely, not for Europe.

The inclination to overuse the executive powers through the ideology was usually curtailed in the US by the "realistic" approach towards its international policy, given of course that the policy sometimes was also used as a token in domestic political quarrels. American international policies of the second half of the XX c. seem to work, because of this "pragmatic check" (of a doctrine being a practice, not just a call sign). This "pragmatic check" is especially important for the country like the United States, where the executive powers are vested in pragmatically symbolic figure of the President, and his Cabinet members. However, the symbolism points also towards the significance of such practical solution. By virtue of being elected the President, the Cabinet is of his choosing and the worldview presented will also be of his choosing. This is what makes it really a full figure of two executive bodies¹³: the theological, or intangible, in sense of ideological inclinations, and practical, norm transmutation into its tangibility of cause – effect pragmatic outcome.

Perhaps it is a charisma of a person that may allow the straightforward transfer of one's own inclination on the "face value" of the presidential winner, if the winner verbally exemplifies the norms believed to be true. Therefore, making someone more popular and being less critical than in, perhaps, other cases. Nonetheless, wining the votes and having a doctrine, are two different kinds of executive powers. In the first

¹³ Cf. E. Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies. A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology*, Princeton Press, Princeton 1958.

one, ideology and pleasant intellectual stand will rationally explain the intricacies of the world. And this is sometimes understood as a doctrine by virtue of etymology itself, doctrine (lat.) – body of teaching, or a belief. Whereas, in the second one, doctrine implies transmutation of norm into an activity, and allows the rationally anticipated outcome, or the effect of a belief. As long as the second, pragmatic version of a doctrine was understood as the outcome of presidential doctrines in the past, the American foreign policy was rather easy to understand, however the switch to different “paradigm” – the more liberal in a “leftist” way, that coincides with Europe’s “capitalistic socialism” presented number of misunderstanding, what presented the American foreign policy, as if in disarray. The change of the White House main occupant, with the 44th. President also meant the change in executive theology, that until now was stable by virtue of its tangible effect in world superpower control. The new approach was different. The difference itself was a good enough motif to “rearrange” the international security arena in tuned with the politically correct propagation of equality among the nations. The “equality” was however very quickly “equalized” by aspiration of some nations to be more “equal” than others, like Germany and France in EU, Russia in Eastern Europe, China in a Pacific and everywhere else, and of course the Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Daesh in the Middle East. Perhaps not of Barack Obama’s fault, but surely far away from his concept of moral multilateralism¹⁴.

The theoretical proposition of the non-existent transfer from the wordiness of statements to actual reference in pragmatic behavior of various States in view of their own perspective of security did not however have the intended effect. Presented by Barack Obama the idea of moral multilateralism as motor for positive international security adjustments has been thawed because of its potentiality and idealism, meaning it never became a practice outside of possible appeasement of domestic and foreign public opinion, with media creative influence. The truth is, Barack Obama was not the most respected president abroad, even if liked domestically. It surely did not impress the other strongest nuclear power state and its President, Vladimir Putin¹⁵. Also, the Chinese were not impressed with his overall accomplishments by dissing him upon arrival in Beijing G20 summit. This diplomatically explained can be put on curb of “perhaps, Chinese nationalistic political game”¹⁶, however it seems that the Chinese did not have a strong partner to talk to, during his presidency. In a sense it was an act without fear of any reprimand, since problem of nationalism is one thing, and diplomatic behavior another. Perhaps, the problem being can be explained

¹⁴Math Gobush, *Moral Multilateralism: The Obama Doctrine’s Christian Realism*, <https://providencemag.com/2016/07/moral-multilateralism-obama-doctrine-christian-realism/>

¹⁵ <http://www.npr.org/2013/09/12/221774010/frenemies-forever-why-putin-and-obama-cant-get-along>

¹⁶ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/04/barack-obama-deliberately-snubbed-by-chinese-in-chaotic-arrival-at-g20>

by lack of plain explanation of what the “doctrinal” engagement of Obama implies for the international security, or by ineffectiveness of its premises and outcome in practice, by the above example and not only.

In search of a doctrine and understanding of Obama’s IR policies and “the Atlantic Obama doctrine”

For, what is a doctrine in international relations? In a general definition, of historical and contemporary representation of a “doctrine”, we can conclude that a “doctrine” is a set of beliefs taught as a practice of ethics, in a pragmatic sense. It is therefore not a theory, since theory is an abstraction, and ethics is practice of choices, pragmatics of life. Therefore, its main objective is not the idea, but context of phenomena presenting itself as a choice, that has to be continuously evaluated. However, it does evolve deductively. It is an execution or directing various activities towards the goal accomplishment, based on rational planning and realistic evaluation, envisioned by the leader or leaders. As a proposition, it refers to a belief system or, in other instances, to ideology – if it is systematic general agenda, as well as it can be based on particular common denominator. In practice, it is an executive statement of rules, and usually includes some system of beliefs that may, and usually has, an implication for the countries’ foreign activities. Generally, we can define it, at least for the purpose of this article, as a strategy legitimizing the rules of conduct within the international relations arena.

Doctrines are created *a priori* or within the political process before it crystalizes as a norm, becoming the rule for activities prior to enactment, but also it can “rise” *a posteriori* within the executive orders, as is usually the case with the international relations doctrines. Regardless of description, it is always a focus on a goal, or narrowing of various activities into a scheme directed towards the achievement of a goal. In a particular case, a doctrine sometimes can also be “created” *a posteriori*, by the journalists looking for a clue of the presidency, as the case will be further examined. This last understanding of a doctrine is an example of an “ideological doctrine”, as opposed to typical IR doctrine with its empirical character of evaluation. It seems, that discussing the president Obama’s foreign policies we do have to keep in mind this ideological qualifier. Regardless of many faces of a doctrine, it is considered as a tool of international relations policy clarification, since its main rationale rests on predictability of its statements as a practical purpose. It is essential for national security because of its standing objective, pragmatic path and final reevaluation in face of objective gained or lost. It is not important just for its facilitator but also for other international relations actors being able to use the doctrinal strategy for own purposes

of presenting rational relation between cause and effect activity. If this information is lacking, the international order may become filled with voids and become unstable.

This is of course obvious, but only keeping the above in mind we can consider any foreign policy as having any “scientific” value that can be rationalized in view of the divergent and opposite perspectives. And there is many present, regardless of common doctrinal policy goal and its protagonist explanation. In this sense, we just add to the divagations a question of what was the main goal of American foreign policy during the reign of Barack Obama? Can we see a “goal”, not only hearing the statements about it, but also weighing the American foreign activities by means of achieving that “goal?” This simply implies comparing the deductive norms to inductive norms, looking for a common denominator of a pragmatic value. We have seen it in terms of international activities of president Obama, as compared to those of his predecessors. Not that there wasn’t an idea at the beginning of president Obama’s turn, of what his possible doctrine might look like. One of the propositions was the “solvency doctrine¹⁷” – a doctrine of passive involvement, limited execution and diffused responsibility, another words self-exclusion from typical international relations activities, or at least a step back from own established boundaries.

It seemed at the beginning of our analysis that those norms have been overused by the executive order, however, even abused by the journalists. What evolves at the end is rather an ideological involvement that in practice is full of cynicism. On one hand we have the expectations of conciliatory policy replacing the “us vs. them” policy of G. W. Bush junior, on the other hand, there is yet another conciliation to be made in consideration of global community sharing, an idea of equal partnership in global management¹⁸. Well, seven years later it didn’t materialize, the problems are as abundant globally as ever before. We can notice see that the “escape” from American realism in IR promotes everyone else – Germany, Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, but for a reason of doubt it doesn’t fare well with international peace and means rather an isolationism¹⁹ for the USA, or perhaps even political cynicism(?).

It is hard not to notice some possibly an ideological cynicism in Presidents behavior at the international relations arena. In fact, the problem described can be considered also as that of the political thought, or theory and methodology of international relations, where realism looks at natural forces of political behavior under the scrutiny of “what is?” Furthermore, the idealism or other more ideological statements, in general direct the same towards the “what should be?” or “what is good?” for everyone, or the power in recognition. In this instance, where the “ideology” is

¹⁷ P. Beinart, “The Solvency Doctrine”, Council on Foreign Relations, <http://www.cfr.org/history-and-theory-of-international-relations/solvency-doctrine/p18324>.

¹⁸ Op. cit.

¹⁹ Albert K. Weinberg, *International Affairs: The Historical Meaning of the American Doctrine of Isolation*, *The American Political Science Review* Vol. 34, No. 3 (Jun., 1940), pp. 539-547.

proving that “ideological goal” is best there is, we have nothing left but cynicism by virtue of practical outcome and final statements about the goal itself in making. If for 8 years of making, the outcome is still unknown, the statements on its possible value are disturbing or even cynical²⁰. It is hard not to agree with the Harvard University professor of international relations, when he states “Obama was not a realist president. If he had been, he might have avoided some of his biggest foreign-policy mistakes”.²¹ From the pragmatic point of view, there is a short track from ideology to “practice” of indecisiveness or naïve, yet positive thinking. However, positive in international relations may mean something different from that of philosophy or worldview, since the overwhelming nature, and aggressive nature of man creates the environment of insecurity.

If this is the case, based on thinking pattern recognition of a man – Barack Obama, we can decide by looking at transmutation of intangible, yet rational ideas, into tangible, yet chaotic outcome, in reference to unknown forces affecting them all. Obama's approach when it comes to running foreign policy and activities are seen of course as the opposite of the 43rd. President's George Bush Junior and his interventionist Bush's doctrine²². Obama is focused on negotiation and collaboration as the method of international communication and practical tangible effect building activities. With good intentions, nonetheless, the road to hell is surfaced. From the moments of evaluation when empirical factors begin to play more important role than good intentions, we can notice that there is nothing wrong per se with “good intentions”. Some of the evaluative practices can be done separately under a common denominator; and what evolves in this instance is a goal oriented foreign policy, but still based on real activities and facts, that can be provided for a schematic objective. When there is however, a clash of facts with the leftist-liberal ideology, usually the truth itself is subdued by the “always ideal” – the good intention. And, the problem itself does not only refer to the value of Barack Obama's foreign policies – this can be shown pragmatically, but to the sense of doctrine existence itself.

It seems that the idea of Obama doctrine is not an issue of “what is?”, but rather an issue of “what should be?”. During the long presidency, there should be a doctrine of a president so much tuned into solving the global equality and racial problems, as well as into solving the global economic glitches and international security issues

²⁰ Kevin Liptak, Despite reassurance, Obama warns Europe of a „meaner world“, “Obama found himself warning of an impending shift in the global order, one he advised could lead to a „meaner, harsher, more troubled world” if not stopped”. <http://edition.cnn.com/2016/11/17/politics/obama-europe-germany-angela-merkel/>.

²¹ Stephen M. Walt, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/07/obama-was-not-a-realist-president-jeffrey-goldberg-atlantic-obama-doctrine/>.

²² Mackubin T. Owens, „The Bush Doctrine and the Poverty of International Relations Theory”, Ashbrook Center, Ashland University, <http://ashbrook.org/publications/oped-owens-03-ir-theory/>.

through humanitarian ideals and low bowing in front of other leaders. After all, he did win a Nobel peace prize, before doing anything for peace. Specifically, there should be a doctrine of a very likable president, likable because of different background than that of the typical American establishment, of someone who crosses the boundaries of the old, and sometimes the “evil” ways, of running the political show. Someone very well educated and very well spoken, and someone who respects the “natural law” of every human being regardless of race or nationality.

This however does not mean that the professors of Law do not make mistakes, or say things not exactly corresponding to intellectual truth. This was the case – what is typical of German and American establishments – with Obama’s awkward statement of the “Polish concentration camps”²³ (without mentioning that at the time of WWII the Germans occupied Poland and those camps located throughout Europe, not only in Poland, were in fact German). There was later some apology given, yet what was said, was said. It is cynical in a sense that Barack Obama had always very good relations with Germany and Angela Merkel, yet treated Poland very pragmatically and rather coldly. We can see this “love” at the 2008 election with Obama as an antidote to Bush’s presidency – in his speech in Berlin, where he was welcomed as a “new hope”²⁴ And this was to be continued from the beginning to the end of his presidency, with another friendly visits in 2013 and 2016. And we can notice that the friendship is rather ideological, than pragmatic in view of the same goals.

Here, at this very sensitive issue for Poland, we can observe not an American ideologist but a rather cynical Obama. And this perhaps will improve our understanding of American delay with the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense in Poland. It did not go along with the German – Russian peaceful business cooperation, rather not receptive of Poland and some other Eastern European states remembering the German – Russian tandem of running the European politics in the past; professors of law should know the proper distribution of facts, even if the executive interests fall in a different ballpark. That is, in this case, the Angela Merkel’s ballpark and long German tradition of, not denying the WWII facts but adding to it, those “little” extras that change the value of the whole. For example, pointing out that deeds of the others during the war were as evil as those, of the Germans. In other cases, it is the exchanging the value of one category with the value of the other category. - Event though Germans ran the Nazi concentration camps throughout Europe, since some of those were located in Poland, it is generalized by the fact of geographical location that the camps were “Polish”. However, the same mistake is not done on other countries where the German-Nazi camps were also located.

²³ Barack Obama, *Remarks by the President at Presidential Medal of Freedom Ceremony – May 29, 2012*, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/29/remarks-president-presidential-medal-freedom-ceremony>, or <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Rd-v24pAg7s>

²⁴ <https://www.theguardian.com/global/2008/jul/24/barackobama.uselections2008>

This cynicism was circumstantiated by friendship with Angela Merkel and close ideological ties to European, especially German establishment promoting the leftist ideology of such renown, in Germany and Europe, of political philosopher Eduard Bernstein's and his idea of socialism with a human face, that is, established not by revolution but evolution²⁵. No wonder that Obama came to Berlin to say good bye to "European friends" in Europe, without inviting the Polish President Andrzej Duda or any counterpart of the Central European leaders. All his friends, with the exception of prime minister May, being the representatives of ideologically leftist provenance present the same front of international relations puzzle where regional powers dictate the political theology to the vassal states, as is the case in the European Union. Thanks to the idea of multilateralism in international relations²⁶, growing out of European ambitions and assertions that shared monopoly of the biggest regional powers dictating international order will bring more stability and harmony in post-Bush environment.

Unfortunately, this "wishful thinking" never materialized or is in grave danger, even if the US – German "tandem" is better off than 8 years ago, everything else seems like it's repetition of problems from the past in a new mask, and with added extras of DAESH and Syria²⁷. The particular effect of this tandem²⁸ – even if at the end the policy of appeasement and conciliation was once again replaced by more practical outlook due to rapid regional – European, security decay. If anything can be seen as the pragmatic outcome, surely not for the USA but for Germany, for it seems that the US executive seceded parts of international responsibility of a single superpower to its closest ideological ally. This however made the other countries of Europe, remembering Germany as the regional power in the past, feel very uneasy. Poland is very best example of this threatened strategically multilateralism, threatened because based on ideological premises and in outcome promoting realistically speaking a country of rather nationalistic tendencies that wants to play a major role in the international politics²⁹. The fear is growing of this German centralism, for

²⁵ Eduard Bernstein, *Evolutionary Socialism*, transl. by Edith C. Harvey, published in 1899, first English translation 1907, <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/bernstein/works/1899/evsoc/index.htm> [29 X 2016].

²⁶ Cf. Álvaro de Vasconcelos and Marcin Zaborowski (eds.), *The Obama Moment. European and American perspectives*, The EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris 2009

²⁷ Angela Merkel and Barack Obama, "Remarks by President Obama and Chancellor Merkel of Germany in a Joint Press Conference in Berlin, November 17, 2016. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/11/17/remarks-president-obama-and-chancellor-merkel-germany-joint-press>

²⁸ Anthony Faiola and Juliet Eilperin, "Obama to bid bittersweet farewell to closest partner on world stage", *The Washington Post*, November 15, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/obama-to-bid-bittersweet-farewell-to-closest-partner-on-world-stage/2016/11/14/68df7b4c-a91d-11e6-ba59-a7d93165c6d4_story.html

²⁹ George Friedman, "Germany Emerges", *Geopolitical Weekly*, February 10, 2015, Stratfor. <https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/germany-emerges>, Cf. Paul Carrel, Merkel calls for Germany to get more involved

the other countries' "say" in the EU has been over the time rather diminished. The American – European rapprochement is strengthening Germany, but weakening the smaller countries of Europe, and leaving them to fear of German – Russian tandem in economic cooperation.

We can multiply the above matters and corresponding complications in view of general inclination to evaluate Barack Obama's foreign policies through his some of the final major statements about his international relations policy that we can notice in *The Atlantic* and its analysis of president Obama's foreign relations activities in Goldberg's *The Obama Doctrine* and following debate³⁰. Since the discussion evolved, and "doctrine" was called to being by a journalist and political analyst Jeffrey Goldberg, at the end of the pres. Obama's last term, we can seriously ask: Obama's doctrine? Really? At the end of term when it is almost as gone, as the months pass by between November 8th and new president's, oath on January 20th 2017? This surprise is visible in many articles, some of them very critical that started the discussion on non-existent up to date, in the opinions of some analysts, Obama's doctrine³¹.

As some of the discussants claim, this so-called doctrine is really a propaganda scheme run by the discussion in *The Atlantic*, for the purpose of making look good the president Barack Obama. In this way at least is this discussion and interview with pres. Obama described by some of the critics. Joseph Loconte, in his article "Journalist as Propagandist: Jeffrey Goldberg and the Obama Doctrine" puts down the problem very bluntly right off the top in a title and later on presenting his views³². In Loconte's words, the reason for this name calling in a title is rather obvious: Mr. Goldberg attains his idea of an Obama doctrine by his own patronage of president's last moments in the office, "to offer a specious, self-serving version of events unencumbered by unpleasant realities. Throughout the essay the reader is treated to a peculiar brand of journalism: an investigation that avoids asking hard questions, omits contradictory evidence, and either ignores or distorts seminal moments in American diplomatic history"³³.

in world affairs, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-merkel-idUSKCN0W42M0>; "Spiegel Staff", What Some Europeans See When They Look at Germany, March 23, 2015, Spiegel Online, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-power-in-the-age-of-the-euro-crisis-a-1024714.html>

³⁰ Jeffrey Goldberg, "The Obama Doctrine", op. cit.

³¹ James F. Jeffrey, "The Obama Doctrine: Made for the '90s, Disastrous Today", The Washington Institute, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-obama-doctrine-made-for-the-90s-disastrous-today>

³² Joseph Loconte, "Journalist as Propagandist: Jeffrey Goldberg and the Obama Doctrine" <https://providencemag.com/2016/03/journalist-as-propagandist-jeffrey-goldberg-atlantic-obama-doctrine/>

³³ Op. cit.

The critic is honest to the point, where he gives examples of Goldberg's wishes for the idealistic version of US foreign policy, allowing the president his own account of deeds within foreign relations activities. However, the "propagandist" forgets to ask any important questions about it, or being simply "mute" when explanation becomes so gullible, that no one takes it seriously. Yet, the Goldberg states: "My goal... was to see the world through Obama's eyes, and to understand what he believes America's role in the world should be."³⁴ Whatever the president's interviewer goal, it is rather not a very substantial discussion on US foreign policy, since the goal itself was established a little too late, for a doctrine to become real. What does stay apart is its humanistic outlook, and "tough decisions" that had to be made.

It is hard not to notice in any idealistic outlook that once the idea is right, it is right forever, such is its nature, whereas in the realistic outlook this scheme is turned around – the nature determines the ideal unknown. One is the exclusive system, the other inclusive. The symbiosis between the one and the other states of global outlook in international relations allows for proportional set of rules determining the doctrinal outlook. What really determines the debate on current American IR policy is the question of how shift is it and was a rational doctrinal determinant that changes the security strategy of the global superpower? Additional question of course, asks how pragmatic and practical was the direction taken during the 8 year executive dimension of one man's outlook on life? The answers are not always clear, and when analyzing just the speeches of president Obama as the "ideal" of his IR activities, we can clearly see that those speeches on equality, dignity of human being, democracy, liberty, have been spoken many times, but its pragmatic sense remains the same, none of the value is for itself. It is for the reason of the American foreign policy. What is its explanation from the executive stand point, should always be critically examined, nonetheless. In the case of Barack Obama policies there is one journalist approach visible in *The Atlantic* "Obama doctrine" interview and a debate – "we take your word for it", the answers are taken as full explanations. In the continuation of this article, the authors do not pretend to know the answers but will be looking for a reasonable explanation of the current state of security problems, that may be directly linked to president Obama's foreign policies.

The more detailed and chronological discussion on the above issues will be continued in the second part of this article, titled *Barack Obama's Presidency In View Of Foreign Policy Arrangements Affecting Regional And International Security*, in the next issue of the National Security Studies – 11/2017. At the time of post-election changes at the Executive Office we will be able to see comparative reasons and differences in the decision making processes determining American foreign activity and its direct

³⁴ Op. cit.

influence on European, regional and global security agenda. The allowance will be made also for the presentation of specifically Poland's security needs, in view of the NATO and US cooperation.

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AMERYKAŃSKA I EUROPEJSKA AGENDA BEZPIECZEŃSTWA ZA PREZYDENTURY BARACKA OBAMY A PERSPEKTYWA DOKTRYNY

Streszczenie. Głównym tematem analizy jest w artykule zagadnienie bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego w perspektywie ogólnej agendy dla przestrzeni Euro-Atlantyckiej, w wymiarach politycznych i wojskowych, oraz instytucjonalnych i organizacyjnych, w sektorach bezpieczeństwa, przez pryzmat oficjalnych streszczeń, dyskusji oraz działań ze względu na poglądy prezydenta Baracka Obamy i wpływu na relacje z Unią Europejską, Polską i innymi państwami regionu. W sensie metodologicznym nastawienie autorów w temacie jest analityczne, gdzie poszczególne fragmenty opisów, zwłaszcza ewaluacji bezpieczeństwa i podejścia w tej dziedzinie do opisu relacji międzynarodowych, mogą zostać zastąpione uogólnieniem i końcową syntezą. Analizowana czasoprzestrzeń określona jest przez dwie kadencje prezydentury Baracka Obamy. Jak autorzy stwierdzają, główne strategiczne założenia bezpieczeństwa euroatlantyckiego

określane są przez amerykańską egzekutywę. W związku z tym, zmiana nastawienia Amerykanów przez pryzmat władzy prezydenckiej rzutuje automatycznie na relacje z Europą, oraz determinuje jej sytuację polityczno-wojskową. Nie mniej wzrost znaczenia Unii Europejskiej w pokrywającym się okresie też odpowiednio wpływa na bezpieczeństwo Euro-Atlantyckie, również i Polski w sensie zdeterminowania ogólnej polityki europejskiej, oraz partykularnych założeń bezpieczeństwa określanych przez pryzmat strategii partyjnych. W tym sensie autorzy rozważają sens znaczeniowy i wpływ tzw. „doktryny Obamy” na strategię bezpieczeństwa Euro-Atlantyckiego.

Słowa kluczowe: stosunki międzynarodowe, polityka, polityka wojskowa, polityka bezpieczeństwa, Polska, Unia Europejska, Stany Zjednoczone.